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The use of linked data and non-consent methodologies is a rapidly growing area of health research
due to the increasing detail, availability and scope of routinely collected electronic health records
data. However, gaining the necessary legal and governance approvals to undertake data linkage is a
complex process in England.
Objectives
We reflect on our own experience of establishing lawful basis for data linkage through Section 251
approval, with the intention to build a knowledgebase of practical advice for future applicants.
Methods
Thematic analysis was conducted on a corpus of Section 251 feedback reports from the NHS Health
Research Authority Confidentiality Advisory Group.
Results
Four themes emerged from the feedback. These were: (a) Patient and Public Involvement,
(b) Establishing Rationale, (c) Data maintenance and contingency, and the need to gain (d) Further
Permissions from external authorities prior to full approval.
Conclusions
Securing Section 251 approval poses ethical, practical and governance challenges. However, through
a comprehensive, planned approach Section 251 approval is possible, enabling researchers to unlock
the potential of linked data for the purposes of health research.
Keywords
data linkage; section 251; thematic analysis; non-consent approaches
Highlights
• Gaining Section 251 support can be a lengthy and
complex process and there is partial guidance to
help researchers navigate the ethical, practical and
governance issues needed to gain approval.
• This study aims to synthesise available information
using a corpus of existing S251 feedback from previous
applications, and to build a knowledge base that will
support future applicants.
∗Corresponding Author:
Email Address: lec67@medschl.cam.ac.uk (Lauren Cross)
The research was conducted whilst Lauren Cross was employed at King’s College London.
• Four themes emerged from the feedback. These were:
(a) Patient and Public Involvement, (b) Establishing
Rationale, (c) Data maintenance and contingency, and
(d) Further Permissions from external authorities prior
to full approval.
Introduction
Informed consent is a fundamental principle governing the use
of patient identifiable information within health research [1, 2].
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It is recognised, however, that there are situations where
gaining informed consent may undermine the ability to conduct
research in the public interest. Consent requirements can cause
systematic response biases leading to unrepresentative samples
which challenge the validity of research findings, and possible
over or underestimation of risk-outcome effects [3]. In addition,
large scale participant recruitment and measurement of
research variables can simply prove too costly for participants
and research funders to sustain using conventional cohort
methodologies [4].
In England and Wales, Section 251 (S251) of the
NHS Act 2006 provides statutory power to allow NHS
patient identifiable information needed to support essential
research activity to be used without individuals’ consent.
Following approval, patient identifiable information can
be transferred without breach of common law duty of
confidentiality, enabling novel large-scale research which might
not be appropriate or achievable using traditional consented
approaches. Recent examples of using linked psychiatric
electronic health records linking with external data sources
include health services research studies examining acute
hospital admission patterns in patients with severe mental
illness [5], falls and fractures in people with severe mental
illness [6], and school absence patterns in young people
receiving specialist mental health care [7].
Although S251 can facilitate large data resources, and
highly powered large-scale research studies, it is essential that
applications are approached carefully and responsibly. Securing
the correct approvals for data linkage can be a lengthy
and complex process in England [8]. Application guidance is
limited, and although some application guidance is provided it
is not always in a user-friendly format and genuine insight is
often gained through a ‘trial-and-error’ basis. The aim of this
study was to synthesise available information using a corpus of
existing S251 feedback from previous applications for approval,
and to build a knowledge base that will to support future
applicants. It should also be noted that the common shorthand
“S251 approval” is not an accurate representation of the
process discussed in this analysis. Approval is given under the
Health Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations
2002, and S251 NHS Act 2006 creates the authority for these
Regulations.
This review has been conducted as part of King’s
College London’s (KCL) Medical Research Council Pathfinder
programme (MC_PC_17214) to replicate and facilitate
mental health electronic records data linkages with the
intention of creating a national network of linked data. To
our knowledge, it is the first study of its kind.
Methods
Information were gathered from a corpus of nine documents
related to research applications to link data for research
including: four Confidentiality Advice Team (CAT) feedback
forms and five Confidentiality Advisory Group (CAG) outcome
letters from S251 applications. The CAG offer independent
and expert advice on S251 approval to the Health Research
Authority and Secretary of State for Health, whereas the CAT
provides pre-application assessment prior to formal scrutiny by
∗One application was submitted by SLaM on behalf of another NHS mental health trust.
the CAG. Not all study applications are reviewed by the CAT
team. Therefore, one application had an outcome letter but
did not have a CAT feedback form.
All research applications were made by, or in collaboration
with∗, the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation
Trust (SLaM) issued between May 2017 and July 2019. Two
applications (Documents 1–4) were made prior to, and three
applications after The Data Protection Act 2018.
SLaM is a large mental health Trust covering a geographic
catchment of four London boroughs (Lambeth, Southwark,
Lewisham, and Croydon) and a diverse population of around
1.2 million residents. It is the main provider of comprehensive
adult mental health care to its catchment area population,
as well as providing prison in-reach and a number of
national specialist services. SLaM has an extensive track
record in data linkage, developing means and expertise to
derive research output from linked electronic mental health
records through the Maudsley Biomedical Research Centre
(established with NIHR funding in 2007) and longstanding
partnerships with King’s College London.
The S251 research applications included in this review
sought approval to link electronic mental health records
data to a variety of existing health and non-health
administrative data resources including: Department for
Work & Pensions employment and benefits data, maternity
and neonatal/paediatric electronic health records data,
Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service
data around care proceedings, Hospital Episode Statistics data
concerning physical health, and HIV and AIDS electronic
health record data. All Trusts and bodies have been
anonymised within the text to retain anonymity.
Data was analysed using thematic analysis (Braun, 2012)
and coded using NVivo software. The thematic analysis
involved 5 key steps: i) familiarisation with the data, through
repeated readings of the transcripts during which thoughts
and potential codes were noted; ii) generation of initial codes,
through intense open-coding of data to generate an initial
coding frame based on thematic categories rooted in the data;
iii) identification of themes, through a detailed review of the
coding frame to sort codes in to potential themes; vi) review
of themes, through refinement of the developing themes;
v) definition and refinement of themes, through detailed
exploration of relationships within and between codes, merging
and pruning of codes, and revision of thematic definitions [9].
Applications were initially coded by one researcher (LC).
Findings and emerging themes were tested for validity through
one to one and group discussions with the interdisciplinary
team of co-authors, who have backgrounds in data science,
clinical epidemiology and NHS information governance. This
was done through team discussion rather than independent
cross-referencing as the documentation had previously been
reviewed by all team members. Further, this analysis is
unusual as documentation, rather than participant interview
transcripts, were analysed.
Results
Of the five applications submitted, four were provisionally
supported and one outcome deferred (although supported
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in principle). Four themes emerged from the feedback given
by the CAT and CAG. These were: (a) Patient and Public
Involvement, (b) Establishing Rationale, (c) Data maintenance
and contingency, (d) Further permissions (See Table 1). In
addition, ideas concerning clarity, consistency and detail were
evident across all themes within the text.
Patient and Public Involvement (PPI)
The importance of engagement with patients was one of the
most predominant themes within the feedback, and explicitly
stated to be “considered an important factor ” in more recent
outcome letters (e.g. Document 4, P4, L39). Within this
theme four sub-themes were present, highlighting that patient
engagement work should be: embedded, evidenced, targeted
and accessible.
Embedded
Analysis of the text highlights that PPI work should be present
throughout the research cycle “members acknowledged that
this group had been consulted in the design phase of the
project and would continue to be engaged with as the project
progressed, which was commended ” (Document 5, P4, L20).
The emphasis here was on an approach to PPI that was beyond
tokenistic, forming an integral part of the research schedule
and strategy. In particular, there appeared to be two phases of
the research cycle in which PPI is viewed as of importance.
First, during the initial stages (prior to linkage) the
CAG expected methodological consideration from service users
“feedback from the planned activity would also need to be
reported to understand the views of this cohort in relation to
the proposal ” (Document 3, P5, L30); and specific focus on
the use of patient identifiable information during the linkage
process “further information would be required in this area
to confirm that the service user group understood that the
proposed linkage would involve the disclosure of confidential
patient information to another organisation” (Document 5,
P5, L9).
Second, the CAG required the development of information
materials to raise the profile of a potential linked database
highlighting its use for research activities once the intended
linkage is complete. This includes informing patients and the
public about how their data is being used, and importantly
the opportunity and tools to object (opt-out) “The Group was
satisfied that the patient notifications and dissent mechanisms
offered were appropriate and adequate for the project”
(Document 5, P4, L40). Such information needs to be released
with enough time ahead of the linkage to allow a “specific time
period for meaningful opt-out” (Document 1, P3, L27).
The CAG strongly endorsed channels and mechanisms
for dissent or opt-out to remain up-to-date and clearly
communicated to the public. Applications without clear opt-
out / dissent mechanisms were asked to be amended “ It was
commented that the posters should be revised to include
information around patient opt-out” (Document 4, P5, L11).
Such communication can, however, be successfully achieved
through a number of different channels including: public-
facing websites, posters and leaflet materials containing clear
guidance regarding notification and dissent.
All of the applications relied on local opt-out mechanisms,
however as the NHS national opt-out scheme (whereby, in the
UK, any patient can opt out of their NHS data being used for
secondary purposes now or in the future) becomes mandatory
[10], future applications will have to consider both national
and local governance systems to enable sufficient notification
and dissent.
Evidenced
It was clear from the text that evidence of PPI work needs to be
explicit and contained within the appendices of an application.
Where detail was not provided, or documents were missing,
this was requested “this poster had not been included in the
submission. CAG asked that it was provided ” (Document1,
P4, L40), although draft forms and intended updates were
deemed acceptable evidence. This means that communication
materials do not have to be already approved and in circulation
prior to application.
As previously highlighted, in the context of service
user groups, the CAG were interested in clear and explicit
confirmation of the acceptability of use of patient identifiable
data during the linkage process. We illustrate this, below
from the PPI minutes which were submitted to, and
Table 1: Summary table of themes and subthemes
Themes








a) Establishing appropriate grounds
b) Establishing appropriate and proportionate use of data
3. Data maintenance and contingency
4. Further permissions
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subsequently commented on by the CAG within the feedback:
“[The researcher] described the process of the linkage and
emphasised that although the linkage uses identifiers like name
and date of birth, no health data leaves SLaM and health
data is only available to researchers once identifiers have
been removed and the linkage is complete” (Document 10,
P2, L10). “Group feedback: Linkage process – No comments.
Everyone happy with proposed process” (Document 10, P2,
L29). Therefore, it is important that applicants approaching
PPI work with service users, incorporate explicit questioning
and careful minute-taking of this to support their S251
application.
Targeted
Feedback from the CAT and CAG highlighted that, in order
for PPI work to be meaningful, it needed to be project-specific
and discussed with those who were likely data subjects “ it
is unclear from the detail provided whether there has been
any specific engagement involving patients with [the specific
disorder]” (Document 6, P2, L20). In addition, it requires
targeted communication pathways “The project was relying
on the established communications strategy for the [research
database] within [NHS Trust 1] as the project notification
and dissent mechanism. Members agreed that, due to the
sensitivities around the information which would be linked for
the project, specific information should be displayed on the
CRIS website, to enable a project-specific objection mechanism
to be operated ” (Document 3, P5, L35).
Accessible
Analysis revealed that a sensitive approach to PPI is required,
with information accessible to all users. First, it is important
that any information is easily found and acted upon by patients
and the public “The Group was of the opinion that the
patient’s right to opt-out was . . . difficult to locate when
reviewing the information online” (Document 2, P5, L27).
This is inclusive of control groups where the intention is to
use individual-level data “The Group agreed that the control
group needed to be informed about the study and given the
opportunity to dissent, unless the data was available only in
aggregated form” (Document 1, P5, L3). Accessing control
groups from the general population who do not use mental
health services is acknowledged as challenging; however, efforts
should be made to explore existing engagement pathways
already in operation for the administrative database intended
to be linked.
Moreover, a variety of communication mechanisms were
recommended in order to maximise information promotion
and response pathways “when offering dissenting options to
patients, it was preferred that a number of communication
modes are provided, i.e. telephone, email and postal ”
(Document 4, P5, L11). Therefore, applicants should aim to
develop a range of different mechanisms and formats to deliver
information to patients and the public. Notably, social media
was only briefly mentioned within one document (Document
9, P2, L18); therefore, given the increasing use of digital tools
within the public domain [11], this is a potentially under-used
(or at least under-acknowledged) resource within PPI work
for S251 approval. However, it is acknowledged that the use
of digital tools for PPI work has its own biases as certain
community groups may have limited access to these platforms
to provide their feedback.
Finally, clarity of information was highlighted as a central
characteristic of successful PPI work. Patients and the public
should not only have access to information, but it should
be written in a digestible format for a non-expert reader
“members also commented that the information should clearly
explain the governance arrangements for the project, to ensure
that it was clear that identifiable information would only
be used to facilitate linkage between the data sources and
advise that analysis would be undertaken on an anonymised
dataset” (Document 3, P6, L4). This is essential as patients
need knowledge to make an informed opinion as to whether
they wish to dissent or disagree with the linkage. Applicants
should aim to include plain English summaries of all technical
aspects of the data linkage and access arrangements to
interpret and explain text as appropriate. This will promote
understanding and is essential when presenting to service user
groups, and designing promotional material. However, there
are other challenges for undertaking meaningful PPI including
time constraints and financial implications [12]. These issues
can potentially be overcome through the use of pre-existing
PPI networks.
Establishing rationale
The second most predominant theme within the documents
and feedback from the CAG was the need to justify research
and methodological rationale for projects. Given the potential
sensitivity and nature of S251 as a mechanism for allowing
data use without individual consent, it was not surprising that
identifying need and establishing a clear project framework
was a key concern for those granting approval. This was
captured within the text through the themes of justification
of appropriate: grounds, use of data, and security protocol.
Establishing appropriate grounds
One of the more important aspects of securing authorisation
from the CAG was establishing a lawful basis for S251
approval. This means that applicants should be able to justify
that a) the purpose of the project is for medical research and
in the public interest, and b) the proposed methodology is
appropriate and proportionate to the study objectives. These
principles are aligned to the Data Protection Act (DPA)
1998 & 2018.
This was most effectively achieved in applications through
explicit mention that certain GDPR exception conditions have
been met. For example, “In terms of Schedule 3, we consider
that Condition 8 has been met. (1) The processing is necessary
for medical purposes and is undertaken by- (a) a health
professional, or (b) a person who in the circumstances owes
a duty of confidentiality which is equivalent to that which
would arise if that person were a health professional. (2) In
this paragraph “medical purposes” includes the purposes of
preventative medicine, medical diagnosis, medical research,
the provision of care and treatment and the management of
healthcare services” (Document 8, P2, L34), accompanied
by sound academic justification “members noted that the
applicants have provided a number of sound justifications
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which supported the requirement for research in order to gain
a better understanding of the mental health needs of mothers”
(Document 3, P3, L13). Applicants are thus expected to pair a
research rationale with meeting specific conditions of the DPA
in order to clearly identify that the proposal is appropriate for
medical purpose.
Regarding justification for non-consent methodologies,
sample size and bias were the most referenced arguments. In
the context of sample, the CAG were receptive to the notion
that in cases where the target population was of a considerable
size it would not be practical nor possible to capture
the entire population through traditional methodologies.
Furthermore, there was acknowledgement that attempts to
recruit participants de novo could incur biases leading to
groups who are harder to reach being systematically excluded
from the analyses. This is particularly relevant to mental health
research, where those who have greater need and complex
clinical and social comorbidities are less likely to be represented
in traditional research.
Establishing appropriate and proportionate use of data
The CAG requested clear and concise detail on exactly which
data were being requested. This encompassed explicit detail
on the scope: “Will a retrospective cohort be included within
the database (i.e. back to 2005 at NHS Trust 2 and 2014
at NHS Trust 3 when BadgerNet was introduced)? If so,
provide further details of this cohort” (Document 8, P1, L17);
and the size of the cohort “Clarify the anticipated size of
the patient cohort to be included in the database (mothers
and babies)” (Document 8, P1, L20). This attention to detail
enables the CAG to establish exactly what the linkage will look
like, and the information available to researchers. However, the
rationale behind why sensitive information is necessary is also
important “Part B Q4 – states that date of death is required for
analysis- provide clarification around why this is required. . . ”
(Document 9, P2, L12). Therefore, those applying for S251
approval should be able to justify not only precisely which data
they wish to be linked, but how it will be used. This reflects a
clear concern that data are to be used appropriately: “confirm
that patients’ country of birth will be used for linkage purposes
only and not included in the analysis of the data” (Document
1, P6, L16).
Justifying appropriate security protocol
Security of procedures and personnel was an essential
component of securing S251 approval. For example, data
transfer along a secure pipeline was also cited as important:
“Clarify how and to who data will be transferred ” (Document
9, P1, L20). This should be explicit “patient identifiers will
be sent via an N3 connection” (Document 9, P1, L29); and
adhere to a secure transfer protocol (a system in which data
are accessed, managed and transferred via an assured data
pipeline).
Furthermore, all sites involved in the data linkage process
(whether processing or hosting) require adequate demonstration
of security adherence. It was a requirement of all applicants
to achieve a grading of ‘standards met’ on the NHS Data
Security and Protection (previously Information Governance)
Toolkit submission (NHS Digital, 2019) to evidence internal
data storage and access procedures, and to promote legitimate
and safe use of data. For example, “Specific Conditions of
Support (Provisional). . . 2. Confirmation provided from the
IG Delivery Team at Health Organisation 1 to the CAG that
the relevant Data Security and Protection Toolkit (DSPT)
submission(s) has achieved the ‘Standards Met’ threshold. See
section below titled ‘security assurance requirements’ for further
information.” (Document 6, P6, L24).
The CAG also emphasised the importance of ensuring all
personnel handling data had appropriate clearance, typically
contractual agreements were used to evidence compliance
“This honorary contract ensures that all individuals working
on the data have a duty of confidentiality ” (Document 8,
P2, L34). This provides assurance that all personnel uphold
security standards and the duty of confidentiality and care.
In particular, as they have temporary access to Patient
Identifiable Information (PII), there were concerns regarding
the specifics of personnel conducting the matching “It states
that NHS Trust 1 identifiers will be transferred to a named
member of staff at the non-health governmental department
who will conduct the matching of identifiers; however, later in
the form (Part B, Q3) it states that identifiers will be accessed
by a small informatics team at the DWP. Clarify how and to
who data will be transferred and who will have access to this
identifiable information held at DWP for linkage” (Document
9, P1, L15). Applicants for S251 approval should therefore
have a clear and evidenced policy and approval procedure to
ensure that all staff handling data (either at point of linkage
or analysis) do so appropriately and with care. Furthermore,
due to the sensitive nature of data linkage, keeping the number
of individuals involved in handling matching proceedings to a
minimum, andbeing able to explicitly name such individuals, will
strengthen applications. This acts tominimise the scope for data
misuse and ensures accountability for any security breaches.
Data maintenance and contingency
A small but noticeable theme from the feedback text highlights
the importance of legacy planning for the future of the data-
base once linkage is complete. This was cited as needing
to include fiscal and human resources to support data
management “ it was unclear what would happen to the study
data if the additional funding was not received ” (Document
4, P4, L17); to identify a clear time-line “Clarify how long
the request for support is anticipated to last” (Document 9,
P1, L11); and to clarify an exit strategy, as appropriate: “Can
you confirm the intended exit strategy from support under
the Regulations- i.e. will Health organisation 1 be destroying
the file including confidential patient information, and the
timeframe for this” (Document 7, P3, L15). Therefore, it is
important that researchers carefully consider the maintenance
and legacy of the database after its creation. Having a
clear picture of what will happen next, and explicitly when
confidential data will be destroyed (and by whom) is essential.
Further permissions
This is an acknowledgement that S251 is only one part
of the process and additional permissions are required to
signify approval prior to sign-off. In the UK, as stated
in Regulation 5 of the Health Service (Control of Patient
5
Cross, L et. al. / International Journal of Population Data Science (2020) 5:1:34
Information) Regulations 2002, approval of an NHS Research
Ethics Committee (REC) is a requirement for confidential
patient information processed under the Regulations for
medical research. Therefore, NHS REC approval is an essential
requirement to permit research involving NHS patients, and
those in social care, and ensure the research is independently
reviewed against an ethical framework. Applicants should note
that S251 can be granted pending REC approval, therefore it
is possible to secure provisional S251 approval before REC
approval is in place.
In addition, Caldicott approval was included within
supporting documentation of all applications in the form
of a signed letter. Caldicott Approval refers to permissions
granted by the Caldicott Guardian. Caldicott Guardians are
typically a senior member of staff within a health or social
care organisation, tasked with ensuring personal information
about those who use its services is used legally, ethically
and appropriately in order to maintain confidentiality [13].
However, it only provides governance assurance for health
data. There are no Caldicott equivalents for administrative
non-health data (for example a linkage with the Department
for Education’s National Pupil Database, which comprises
school’s data), and whilst additional approval is sought from
non-health authorities by the CAG there doesn’t appear to be
a consistent gold standard as to which form approval should
take.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to summarise feedback from
the NHS Health Research Authority Confidentiality Advisory
Group on S251 applications in England. To our knowledge, this
is the first exploration of its kind, providing valuable insights to
support future applicants wanting to use routinely collected,
linked NHS data for the purpose of research.
From the findings we derive the following recommendations
for future S251 applications:
1. Applicants should undertake substantial PPI work prior
to application, and continue to engage with patients and
the public throughout the research cycle. This should be
comprehensive, project-focused and broadly accessible
to both service users and control groups. Particular
efforts should be made to engage with those whose data
will be used, and to communicate opt-out procedures.
2. Careful and clear documentation of PPI work should be
included in appendices to support the application. As
well as views on the rationale for the proposed linkage
and its intended use, applicants should carefully evidence
explicit confirmation of patients giving methodological
approval for the use of patient identifiable information
within the linkage process as well as notification
and dissent mechanisms within data-base promotion
materials.
3. Applicants should build a strong case, rooted in
evidence, that S251 approval is appropriate and indeed
necessary. Where GDPR conditions have been met, this
should be explicitly stated to establish a legal basis for
deviating from common law duty of confidentiality.
4. Applicants should carefully consider security when
putting together proposals. This should be inclusive of
both technical and human factors. As such, applicants
should seek to go beyond following the ‘letter of the
law’ but embed protocols to exceed this- facilitating
robust security procedures to protect patient identifiable
information and sensitive data.
5. Applicants should establish a legacy for the maintenance
of the linked database in terms of finances and data
management, and an exit strategy for the secure
destruction of identifiable data within a suitable
timeframe.
6. Applicants should not rely on the S251 in isolation in
order to satisfy legal requirements to link data. Approval
should also be sought from additional authorities
(including gaining REC and Caldicott assurance) to
permit appropriate and safe use of health data and
associated linkages to other data sources.
7. Finally, careful attention to detail is necessary for a
successful S251 application.
As far as we are aware, there is no academic literature
on this topic. This makes it difficult to verify findings,
although our experiences and recommendations are similar to
those given by the CAG [14]. However, our analysis is novel
in providing a practical framework to assist in interpreting
guidance and supplementing advice provided by the CAG. As
identified by our analysis, the CAG advice highlights the need
for proportionate PPI. This includes engaging patients and
public where feasible and providing clear object and dissent
mechanisms. However, the CAG does not provide specific
details on how to achieve this in practice. Similarly, establishing
rationale is also a prominent theme identified within both
our analysis and advice provided by the CAG. This highlights
that applicants will need to satisfy the legal requirements
established under S251; medical purposes, participant consent
unable to be reasonably sought, the proposed research is
in the public interest, and no reasonable alternative. As in
the context of PPI, the CAG does not however provide
detail on what may be considered reasonable or indeed
appropriate and proportionate use of data beyond minimizing
the identifiers requested for linkage. Furthermore, establishing
security protocol is a theme present both within our analysis
and guidance provided by the CAG. Whilst the CAG’s advice
largely focuses on human resource aspects of data security
including contractual obligation detailed within our analysis,
an interesting piece of practical advice highlighted within
the CAG’s guidance but omitted from our analysis, is the
preference for a third party to undertaking the data linkage
utilizing pseudonyms or a data-linkage key. However, there is
no further detail provided regarding specific technical security
standards deemed acceptable for accessing confidential patient
information for the purpose of research within the CAG’s
standardized advice pages beyond validation through IG
toolkits.
Our major themes, data maintenance and contingency, and
further permissions were also consistent with CAG published
advice. As in our analysis, the CAG outlines the need
to consider the legacy of the data and putting in steps
to withdraw support and highlight the need for additional
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approval. Similar to our findings, REC approval is explicitly
mentioned however Caldicott Approval is not. Therefore,
Caldicott Approval may strengthen an application but is not
necessary for permission to be granted by the CAG. Our
findings were also consistent with CAG advice in the context
of non-health data, however whilst establishing lawful basis
and securing permission were stated as essential, neither our
analysis nor the CAG’s advice provide a gold standard for
implementation practice. Therefore, establishing a non-health
data alternative is potentially a necessary and useful area of
future attention.
Limitations & future research
Findings and recommendations should be interpreted with
caution, bearing in mind certain limitations with our approach.
In particular, the analysis was based on a relatively small and
select sample of applications for approval for data linkage
produced under the auspices of a single site. Therefore,
commentary and feedback may be specific to the experiences,
strengths and weaknesses of this organisation. However,
although the sample was select, there was heterogeneity across
research topics, proposed linkages and methodologies. We are
also aware that not all the themes generated by our analyses
will be applicable to all future S251 applications and caution
must be used in incorporating all our recommendations.
Another limitation of this study is the use of thematic analysis
to explore this topic. Although thematic analysis is very good
for a broad overview of the data and can be used on documents
in addition to research interviews, it is not nuanced enough as
a methodological tool to explore the language used nor is it
sophisticated enough to explore a particular phenomenon.
Furthermore, as far as we are aware, there is no academic
literature in this area. This makes it difficult to verify findings.
However, our experiences and recommendations do appear
consistent with advice given by the CAG [14]. Any conclusions
should therefore be considered as first steps in building a
knowledge base regarding applying for health record linkage
permissions, and as a stimulus for further exploration and
collation of experience to help cross-validate and extend
findings.
Conclusion
Gaining Section 251 support can be a lengthy and
complex process. To date there has been limited guidance
that helps researchers navigate the ethical, practical and
governance issues needed to gain approval. The analysis
and recommendations within this article provide reasoned,
evidenced, and clear approaches to preparing future
applications. We hope it supports both future applicants
and the CAG as the recommending authority, to continue
high quality research using existing NHS data resources and
enhance the nation’s health and social care.
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